Surrender or ceasefire
Our practice shows that Israel’s habitual approach when facing enemies—"if we are attacked, we bomb in response until the enemy’s forces are damaged, then we agree to a ceasefire and peacefully watch the enemy celebrate victory" (here it must be emphasized: in their understanding, “victory” is in no way determined by the number of losses they suffered, but solely by the ability to proclaim and celebrate this victory)—is flawed, as it inevitably leads to the enemy, inspired by another “victory,” restoring strength, receiving increased support, and attacking again.
By contrast, the previously traditional method accepted in international law for ending wars—signing an instrument of surrende, i.e., a formal recognition of defeat in the war, imposing on the guilty party the costs of war (reparations), and depriving it of territories (annexations)—actually works.
Photo: Marshall Keitel signs German surrender terms in Berlin, 8 May 1945
After the signing instruments of surrender, accompanied by territorial losses, deportations, and reparations, neither Germany nor even Japan attacked anyone again and transformed into peaceful, civilized, and respected states.
The ancient practice of distinguishing between states of war and peace, formally declaring war, and then formalizing its conclusion and results—is correct.
Whereas all this evasion and ambiguity—where it’s not clear whether we’re at war or not, and we’re not really at war with a neighboring country but with some bad terrorists, and so on—comes from ignorance, a lack of historical knowledge, and a misunderstanding of international law.
The current war began on October 7, 2023 with an attack by the Palestinian Authority (an autonomy on Israeli territory, created under the Oslo Accords) on Israel.
At that time, the war should have been classified as a "Non-International Armed Conflict (NIAC)", since the autonomy is located on Israeli territory (see Where Are Israel’s Borders and What Does Israel Really Occupy).
Contrary to the disgraceful situation where representatives of the Palestinian National Authority sit in the UN, portraying themselves as victims and making demands of Israel, while simultaneously disavowing responsibility for the attack on Israel, Israel should have announced from the very beginning that the attack came from the Palestinian Authority in violation of the Oslo Accords, and that responsibility lies not with some gang in Gaza, but with the legal institution known as the “Palestinian National Authority.”
It was precisely this entity that was entrusted with the administration of the relevant territories, specifically for the purpose of ensuring peace.
Formal responsibility for the attack should also rest with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was a party to the Oslo Accords.
This responsibility of the PNA and the PLO should include compensation for damages, including through territorial losses and the deportation of those whose interests the PLO and PNA are recognized to represent under the Oslo Accords.
For the fundamental principle of law is this: there are no rights without obligations; if an entity has the capacity to possess rights, it thereby also acquires the capacity to bear obligations.
On October 8, 2023, Lebanon entered the war by committing aggression against Israel. Who "Hezbollah" is—we are under no obligation to know; this is an internal issue of the Lebanese Republic. It is the Lebanese Republic that is a UN member and a party to international treaties, and it is the Republic that bears responsibility for the aggression, including by paying reparations, losing (annexed) territories, and deporting the population thereof.
Thus, as of October 8, 2023, the war had already become an international armed conflict. The parties to this conflict are, on the one hand, the Lebanese Republic, as a sovereign state, and the Palestinian Authority, as a non-sovereign but institutionalized autonomy on Israeli territory.
On October 19, 2023, another UN member—the Republic of Yemen—entered the war against Israel. Again, who the "Houthis" are—we are under no obligation to know; the aggression was committed by the Republic of Yemen, and it must bear responsibility for it.
The refusal to recognize the international legal responsibility of a state for armed actions carried out by institutionalized armed formations based and operating on its territory is a catastrophic concept, leading to the creation of “shell states.”
In this framework, shell states are formal structures with the status of a UN member (such as Lebanon and Yemen) or a “UN observer state” (such as the “State of Palestine”), which receive only the rights of a victim of retaliatory strikes and the opportunity to theatrically weep bitterly in the UN Security Council as a victim—as does Riyad Mansour—but without any responsibility for waging war, fearing neither reparations nor territorial losses, thus shielding the real aggressors hidden behind them.
On April 13, 2024, the Islamic Republic of Iran entered the war on the side of Lebanon, Yemen, and the Palestinian Authority, also committing aggression against Israel (see Strike on Iran). That means this is not a separate "12-day war" but the same war that began on October 7, 2023. And joining a war on the side of the aggressor is, in itself, participation in aggression.
And as experience from the time when wars were conducted according to international law—and not by the fantasies of airheaded pink cherubs—shows, namely the successful conclusion of the Second World War, war must be waged to force the aggressor to surrender (recall Dresden, Berlin, Tokyo, and Nagasaki), and should end in surrender, with the aggressor losing territory, paying reparations, and undergoing the deportation of its population from the annexed territories.
This will restore peace and order. And the armed forces of all states with a practical interest in maintaining international order and peace should participate. In fact, this is what the UN was created for. And this is the right of a state that has been subjected to aggression, provided by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which also envisions the participation of other states in collective self-defense (casus foederis).
And yes, UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which, specifically for Israel, invented a prohibition—previously unheard of in international law (territorial annexations of the Third Reich and the Japanese Empire occurred while the UN Charter was already in force—by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Poland, the USSR, and others)—on depriving an aggressor of its territories, even if they were unlawfully seized—must be declared unlawful and in violation of the UN Charter.
The aggressor must lose control over the territory from which aggression was launched until it compensates for the damage and guarantees non-aggression, and paragraph 4 of Article 2 of the UN Charter must be interpreted precisely in this way (and not in the opposite manner, as it is now).
The recent shift observed in diplomatic and even international legal circles—from interpreting international legal norms as requiring firm military suppression and punishment of the aggressor, with methods strict enough to completely deter future wars, to prioritizing a ceasefire with the aggressor at any cost and protecting the aggressor’s population (reflected even in the renaming of “laws of war” to “International Humanitarian Law (IHL)”)—has, in practice, produced the opposite effect: the number of armed conflicts is rising, and therefore so is the number of victims. Wars frozen under the principle of “it doesn’t matter who started it, ceasefire above all” lead to recurrences and new victims. If the price of aggression is not high enough (loss of territory, population, reparations, etc.), and the aggressor is confident it can negotiate a ceasefire at any time, this only stimulates new acts of aggression.
And this kindergarten with tweets on social media instead of following legal formalities and signing the appropriate documents must end. What must return is the reasonable and honest application of international legal procedures.
Publication on the website of Israel’s TV Channel 9 (in Russian)
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