Borders and Territory of Israel
Where, in legal terms, Israel’s borders run and by what they are established
General remarks on argumentation in disputes on this topic
At present, the official position expressed in UN General Assembly resolutions, in documents of the International Court of Justice, the International Criminal Court, and even the Supreme Court of Israel—and adhered to by the overwhelming majority of international lawyers—is that Israel is currently occupying certain “Palestinian territories.” These usually refer to the West Bank of the Jordan River, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip.
However, despite the fact that hundreds of documents employ the firmly established stamp “Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem” and “Israel, the occupying Power,” it is very difficult to find any genuinely legal analysis explaining why these territories are “occupied” and where, in fact, Israel’s borders run under international law.
On the whole, one may state that the tactic of those who argue that Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza are under occupation consists in using, as frequently and in as many documents as possible, the expressions: “occupation,” “occupied territories,” “Israel, the occupying Power.”
In this way, the frequency of repetition creates the impression that we are dealing with something long established and universally recognized, and therefore requiring no substantiation.
Particularly characteristic in this regard is the argument put forward by representatives of the Palestinian National Authority before the ICC in case ICC-01/18, when the Court considered whether “the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and Gaza” are the territory of Israel or, rather, territory of the “State of Palestine” occupied by Israel:
“The West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip have, consistently, been referred to by the international community, including the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, as occupied Palestinian territory, leaving no doubt as to who is entitled to that specific territory.”
(See para. 34 of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber decision of 5 February 2021.)
Such is the “legal” argument: because everyone constantly calls this territory “occupied Palestinian territory,” there is therefore no doubt as to whom the territory belongs.
And it is with precisely this argument that the ICC in The Hague agreed: on 5 February 2021, the ICC issued a Decision that the Court’s jurisdiction extends to the territories of Gaza and the West Bank—including “East Jerusalem”—“occupied by Israel.” On 3 March 2021, the ICC Prosecutor opened an investigation regarding war crimes committed in those territories, and on 21 November 2024 issued warrants of arrest for Israel’s Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.
In reality, this manner of argumentation is not legal. It is not legal even when employed by people in judicial robes.
The legal approach consists in formulating general legal norms applicable to the situation and, on their basis, drawing conclusions from the established facts. Moreover, a “legal norm” means that the norm operates in analogous situations; that is, if we are discussing borders and occupation, then we must first determine the rules generally applicable to borders and occupation—not only with respect to Israel, but in general.
Applicable norms of international law
Accordingly, following a genuinely legal approach, we shall first formulate the legal norms and principles, and then derive conclusions from them.
As can be seen, this approach is radically different from the approach currently taken.
And these principles, despite their apparent simplicity and self-evidence, lead to conclusions that are contrary both to the position taken by most UN documents and to the position of the Supreme Court of Israel.
The principles are as follows:
(1) The territory of a state is the territory within that state’s borders.
(2) A boundary treaty between neighboring (contiguous) states establishes the boundary line between them. Ratification of a boundary treaty renders superfluous the adoption of domestic laws establishing that same boundary.
(3) A situation of "belligerent occupation" can be recognized only where a state’s armed forces occupy territory outside that state’s borders.
(4) The desire—even a very strong one—and even if supported by broad segments of world public opinion—to create one’s own state on the territory of another state is not, in itself, a ground for considering that territory “occupied,” and does not change existing state borders.
Each of these principles, in our view, should be regarded as a norm of international law within the meaning of Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and, as our experience of professional discussions on this topic shows, even lawyers who are staunch opponents of Israel cannot reject the correctness of any of these four principles.
Applying these principles to the question of where Israel’s borders run—taking into account the operative international treaties—leads to the conclusion that both the Gaza Strip and what UN documents call “the West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusalem,” are undoubtedly the territory of Israel, and not “occupied,” and not even any sort of “disputed territory” (["disputed territory"])(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territorial_dispute)
Let us examine this question in more detail and answer: where, precisely, do Israel’s borders run, and what is it that Israel in fact “occupies.”
History
The League of Nations Mandate for Palestine
Since 1922, the territory of Palestine (including the territory of present-day Jordan) was under the administration of Great Britain pursuant to the League of Nations Mandate.
The text of the Mandate itself stated that all of this territory—including that on which the present-day Kingdom of Jordan is located—was initially placed under such administration “in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.”
Then, on 16 September 1922, the Trans-Jordan memorandum (Trans-Jordan memorandum) was adopted, excluding the territory of present-day Jordan from the areas designated for Jewish settlement. And on 25 May 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Transjordan established in that territory attained independence.
The UN Partition Plan and the so-called “1947 borders”
On 29 November 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 “Future Government of Palestine”.
That resolution recommended that two independent states be created in the territory of Mandate Palestine, which was still under British administration—one Jewish and another Arab (in addition to the already independent Jordan).
In discussions of current events, one sometimes hears that the State of Israel is ostensibly an occupier because it holds territory that the resolution designated for the creation of an Arab state.
For example, the relevant Wikipedia article Arab–Israeli War (1947–1949), citing the UN document Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem, states:
As a result of the war, about half of the territories allocated to the Arab state, and West Jerusalem, ended up being occupied by Israel.
Also, for example, the President of France recently stated: “Mr Netanyahu mustn’t forget that his country was created by a decision of the UN.”
However, this is a legally erroneous position. And because it is commonly accepted, it is necessary to consider in more detail the legal significance of Resolution 181.
The Arab side then rejected this resolution—officially, by a joint statement of the League of Arab States dated 15 May 1948 (i.e., the day after Israel declared independence)—and commenced a war against Israel, in which Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen took direct part.
But let us imagine a different situation: on 15 May 1948, on the evening after the Declaration of Independence of Israel, instead of issuing a statement rejecting UNGA Resolution 181 and launching military aggression, the League of Arab States issued a statement that, as the representative of the Arab people, it warmly supports the plan set out in Resolution 181 and confirms the Arab side’s consent to its implementation.
Question: from a legal point of view, what would be Israel’s borders at that moment (15 May 1948) under those conditions?
The legally correct answer is as follows:
According to the text of Resolution 181, it did not, of itself, amend the provisions of the Mandate, did not establish borders, and did not oblige anyone to anything. It recommended a plan for partition of the territory and “requests that … the Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation.”
That is, in the absence of any Security Council decisions, it had no legal consequences—even if the plan it proposed had been approved by both the Arab and Israeli sides.
This did not deprive the parties, in the future, of the possibility of concluding treaties on new borders in accordance with the resolution’s recommendations. But at the time the Mandate ended, since its provisions were recognized as binding (as Resolution 181 itself confirmed) and since it had not been amended, the entire territory west of the Jordan River and up to the Mediterranean Sea, including the city of Jerusalem, became the territory of the Jewish state (i.e., Israel) based on the provisions of the Mandate itself, taking into account Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
In other words, from the perspective of international law, the borders of the State of Israel, as of 14 May 1948, were defined by the borders of the territory that the Mandate designated for the Jewish state. And this remained so until Israel concluded boundary treaties with Egypt in 1979 and with Jordan in 1994 (which, moreover, set the boundary along the same former Mandate lines, as we shall consider in more detail below).
It follows that:
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The borders of Israel’s territory as of 14 May 1948 were legally defined by the borders of the Mandate, the provisions of which were binding and had not been altered.
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The territory of Israel from 1949 (to 1967) was under the unlawful occupation of Jordan (the West Bank and Jerusalem, which Jordan unlawfully annexed in 1950) and Egypt (the Gaza Strip).
The “Green Line” of 1949 (or the “pre-1967 borders”)
In 1949, under UN auspices, negotiations took place between Israel and all the aggressor states except Iraq, which resulted in agreements on armistice lines (1949 Armistice Agreements).
The line of separation of forces following the conclusion of the armistice became known as the Green Line (Green Line).
This line is also sometimes called the “pre-1967 borders” or the “1967 borders.”
Thus, for example, UNGA Resolution of 13 December 2019 (link) speaks of “preserving the principle of two States living side by side within the pre-1967 borders.”
However, the armistice agreements themselves explicitly stated that:
The Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial boundary.
That is, in reality, there never were any “1967 borders.” There was a demarcation line established by the armistice agreements, which, on the contrary, emphasized that it was not a border but merely a line for the withdrawal of forces.
The Six-Day War of 1967
In the course of the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights.
The Sinai Peninsula was subsequently returned to Egypt under the 1979 treaty.
The other territories taken by Israel in 1967, as is clear from the above, must be regarded as territories that, as of 14 May 1967, legally belonged to Israel and were liberated by Israel from the occupation of hostile armies.
The legal difference between the territories taken in 1948–49 and those taken in 1967
Despite the commonly accepted view, there is absolutely no legal difference between the territories of former Mandate Palestine (here we are not speaking of the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights) over which Israel established control in 1967 and those over which it established control in 1949.
In both cases, control over what had been the territory of Mandate Palestine—originally designated for the establishment of the Jewish state—was obtained by Israel in the course of war.
Israel’s contemporary borders and territory
What are a state’s borders and a state’s territory
A state border is a line and the (conventional) vertical surface along that line that defines the limits of a state’s territory (land, waters, subsoil, and airspace), i.e., the spatial limits of the operation of state sovereignty.
A state’s territory is the territory within its borders.
As a rule, borders are established by boundary treaties between neighboring (contiguous) states.
Contrary to popular assertions, borders are not registered with the UN, nor with any other international body.
The Gaza Strip and the Israel–Egypt boundary
Under Article II of the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty of 1979:
The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, 1, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.
The key question here is how to construe the phrase “without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip.”
One encounters the view that this phrase, in itself, determines the existence of some status. But in fact, quite the contrary: it means that the status, as of the time the treaty was concluded, is not determined nor affected by this treaty.
That is, if a treaty were to state that the parties have agreed that a fence will be constructed between them, but “without prejudice to the issue of the color of the fence,” this in no way means that the parties have agreed that the fence is green; on the contrary, the parties have emphasized that the treaty contains no stipulation regarding the possible color of the fence.
Why, then, is the Gaza Strip mentioned separately? Because an additional agreement to the treaty—“Letter Agreement 1 Additional to The Treaty of Peace of 26 March 1979 Between Egypt and Israel, concerning the establishment of full autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip”—provided that the parties would commence negotiations on the modalities for establishing an elected self-governing authority (administrative council). It should be emphasized that the parties agreed only to begin negotiations on a possible establishment of self-governing bodies, not on their establishment; and that the subject of the negotiations was defined as the grant of autonomy with the creation of self-governing organs—not the deprivation of Israel of its territory and not the creation of any other sovereign state upon it.
Thus, from the entry into force of this treaty, the boundary between Egypt and Israel runs where the boundary between Egypt and the former Mandated Territory of Palestine ran; accordingly, on one side of the boundary lies Egypt’s territory, and on the other—Israel’s territory.
That is, the treaty traced the boundary where it had already legally run. But from the moment the treaty entered into force, the basis for determining the boundary line became the provisions of this treaty, not the norms of the Mandate as before.
The Gaza Strip, previously de facto under Egyptian control, is therefore now on the Israeli side of the boundary—that is, on the territory of Israel.
The treaty specifically indicates that Israel has no obligations toward Egypt regarding the status of the Gaza Strip arising from this treaty, apart from the obligation to participate in negotiations on the possible establishment of self-governing bodies.
The Judea and Samaria Area (“West Bank”) and Jerusalem; the Israel–Jordan boundary
Under the Treaty of Peace between the State of Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of 26 October 1994, the rivers Jordan and Yarmouk (a tributary of the Jordan) were set as the established boundary between Israel and Jordan, and it was agreed that if the riverbeds change naturally, the boundary shall follow the new course.
A map is annexed to the treaty on which the boundary between Israel and Jordan is marked. On the map itself, regarding the line of the boundary, it is stated:
“This line is the administrative boundary between Jordan and the territory which came under Israeli Military Government control in 1967. Any treatment of this line shall be without prejudice to the status of that territory.”
Here again, in discussions with anti-Israel opponents, one encounters the view that the phrase “without prejudice to the status of that territory” confers some special status, meaning that although the territory lies on the Israeli side of the boundary, it is not the territory of Israel.
However:
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Such a view contradicts the very concept of a “state border” as the line separating the territories of neighboring states.
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As noted above with respect to the 1979 treaty between Israel and Egypt, and in the example of the hypothetical “color of the fence,” the phrase “without prejudice to the status” does not, of itself, establish any particular status.
Thus, under the 1994 treaty between Israel and Jordan, on the eastern side of the Jordan River lies Jordan’s territory, and on the western side—Israel’s territory.
The Oslo Accords
On 28 September 1995, in Washington, the Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip) was signed—commonly referred to as “Oslo II.”
This agreement did not provide for any change in the boundary between Israel and Jordan established by the treaty noted above.
That the agreement does not affect existing borders is explicitly stated in Article XXXI(5), which provides that the issue of borders is a subject for future negotiations, not for this agreement:
“Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than May 4, 1996, between the Parties. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.”
Thus, this Agreement did not alter Israel’s borders. Consequently, it provided for the creation of a self-governing entity on the territory of Israel.
This Agreement did not provide for the creation of a sovereign state for the Arabs residing in the territory, still less for the extension of its sovereignty to any part of Israel’s territory; and it expressly prohibited such actions unilaterally—see Article XXXI(7):
“Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.”
Accordingly, the actions of the leadership of the Palestinian National Authority that purport, without Israel’s consent, to call themselves a “state” (“State of Palestine”) or to act as a sovereign state constitute a direct and manifest breach of the Oslo Accords and, consequently, from the perspective of those Accords, are legally null.
Thus, at present the boundary between Israel and Jordan still runs along the Jordan River, and the PNA functions on the territory of Israel under the Oslo II Agreement.
The concept of “annexation” in international law
Annexation (Annexation) in international law is, by definition, the unilateral attachment of the territory of another state—that is, the incorporation of another state’s territory without its consent.
Since the establishment of Israel’s boundary with Jordan and with Egypt was effected by concluding treaties with those countries, Israel cannot “annex” territories that belong to Israel under those treaties.
The question of the necessity of conferring citizenship
In debating the legal status of the territories liberated by Israel from Egyptian and Jordanian occupation in 1967, the inevitable question arises whether Israel is obliged to confer citizenship upon all those residing in such territories, if Israel holds Gaza and the West Bank to be its territory.
As a general principle, each state determines, under its own law, who are its citizens and who are not. International law contains no general norm obliging Israel, or any other state, to confer citizenship upon all those residing in territory liberated from occupation or territory that became its territory by virtue of boundary treaties with neighboring states.
It should be noted that the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness) contains a norm under which parties to the Convention undertake to “grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless.” However, Israel is not a party to this Convention (it signed but did not ratify), and thus this norm does not apply to Israel and (absent ratification) creates no obligation for Israel.
Analogous norms exist in the European Convention on Nationality, but it is not applicable to Israel and likewise does not and cannot bind Israel.
At the same time, with respect to stateless persons residing on the territory of Israel—including in the territories of Gaza and the West Bank—the relevant norms of the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons) may be applicable in appropriate cases; Israel has been a party to that Convention since 1958 (see treaty status).
The Golan Heights
Israel annexed the Golan Heights, as it incorporated them (see the Golan Heights Law) without Syria’s consent, to whom they had previously belonged.
With Syria, only a separation-of-forces agreement was signed (Separation of Forces Agreement Between Israel and Syria; May 31, 1974), but the parties remain in a state of war, since the agreement itself stipulated that it is not a peace agreement (“This agreement is not a peace agreement”).
UNSC Resolution 497 (1981)
In this connection, UN Security Council Resolution 497 of 17 December 1981 should also be mentioned.
On the one hand, the assertion in that resolution that “the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and relevant Security Council resolutions” is incorrect. What is inadmissible is the acquisition of territory by aggression.
The taking of territory by force from an aggressor, however, is permissible from the standpoint of international law (thus, after World War II, Germany and Japan lost territory).
In the present case, Syria was the aggressor. Consequently, annexation of the aggressor’s territory is lawful.
On the other hand, notwithstanding that this resolution contains a clear legal error, by virtue of Article 25 of the UN Charter, until it is rescinded, UN members, including Israel, are obliged to comply with its requirements.
That is, Israel must indeed rescind the annexation and regard the territory as occupied rather than annexed—while raising the question of rescinding this resolution as one that violates international law in favor of the aggressor.
The positions of various bodies on the issue under consideration
The United Nations
As noted, the UN employs in numerous documents the expressions “Israel, the occupying Power” and “Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem.”
It is also worth noting in particular the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 13 July 2004.
In para. 78 of that Advisory Opinion, it is asserted that the conclusion of a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan did not alter the fact that this territory is occupied by Israel.
Legally, this is of course utter nonsense, tantamount to asserting that “nothing whatsoever can change the fact that this territory is occupied” or that “never and under no conditions, notwithstanding any treaties, can one acknowledge that this territory belongs to Israel.”
Alas, one must concede that ICJ advisory opinions (which in any event are not binding) can be erroneous.
The Supreme Court of Israel
The Supreme Court of Israel has never considered the question of whether the borders drawn in Israel’s treaties with Jordan and Egypt constitute Israel’s borders with Jordan and Egypt.
As stated in Professor David Kretzmer’s publication “The law of belligerent occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel” (Kretzmer, David. (2012). The law of belligerent occupation in the Supreme Court of Israel. International Review of the Red Cross):
The de facto acceptance by the Israeli authorities that the law applicable in the “occupied territories” is the law governing belligerent occupation spared the Israeli Supreme Court the need to decide what the elements of occupation are. Although the Court referred to this question during Israel’s presence in Lebanon in 1982, and later it also considered whether Israel remained an occupying power in Gaza after the withdrawal of its troops and settlements.
That is, the Supreme Court of Israel has never proceeded on the premise that Israel’s borders are defined by its treaties with Egypt and Jordan.
Thus, in para. 14 of the judgment in Mara’abe v. The Prime Minister of Israel (15 September 2005), the Supreme Court of Israel, presided over by Aharon Barak (Aharon Barak), wrote:
- The Judea and Samaria areas are held by the State of Israel in belligerent occupation. The long arm of the state in the area is the military commander. He is not the sovereign in the territory held in belligerent occupation (see The Beit Sourik Case, at p. 832). His power is granted him by public international law regarding belligerent occupation. The legal meaning of this view is twofold: first, Israeli law does not apply in these areas. They have not been “annexed” to Israel. Second, the legal regime which applies in these areas is determined by public international law regarding belligerent occupation (see HCJ 1661/05 The Gaza Coast Regional Council v. The Knesset et al. (yet unpublished, paragraph 3 of the opinion of the Court; hereinafter – The Gaza Coast Regional Council Case). In the center of this public international law stand the Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (hereinafter – The Hague Regulations). These regulations are a reflection of customary international law. The law of belligerent occupation is also laid out in IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 1949 (hereinafter – the Fourth Geneva Convention)
To a lawyer, this reasoning reads less like a legal conclusion and more like a propagandistic document: the mention of international conventions alongside the conclusion that the territories in question are occupied is plainly intended to create the appearance that the thesis of occupation is grounded in international conventions.
In fact, the Court should first have decided whether, at the time of the case, the territory in question was the territory of Israel or of some other state; and if it belonged to some other state, then decide whether Israel was occupying it. If it was occupying it, the Court should have determined whether both the occupying and the occupied states were parties to the relevant conventions, when they acceded, and whether any reservations had been made upon accession.
Article 2 of the Hague Convention laying down the “Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land” provides that the Convention’s norms bind only the Contracting Powers and only in case all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.
Israel has not ratified that Hague Convention to this day; see the list of parties. But the Court, having mentioned that Convention in its judgment, somehow “modestly” kept silent about this.
Hence the Court’s caveat—“these regulations are a reflection of customary international law.” One may presume the Justices realized that, under Article 2, the Hague Convention was directly inapplicable to the situation, even if there had been an occupation.
For some reason, the Court wished to advance the thesis that Gaza and the West Bank are occupied and to give the appearance that the thesis was based on norms of international law.
The Levy Commission Report
The Report on the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria, also known as the Levy Report, was prepared at the request of the Prime Minister of Israel (Benjamin Netanyahu) and the Minister of Justice (Yaakov Neeman) and published in 2012 by a commission chaired by former Supreme Court Justice Edmond Levy.
The report contained a section entitled “The status of the territories of Judea and Samaria under international law.” The Commission concluded that those territories should not be considered occupied for two reasons (para. 5):
(1)
“the most reasonable interpretation of those provisions of international law appears to be that the accepted term ‘occupier’ with its attending obligations is intended to apply to brief periods of the occupation of the territory of a sovereign state pending termination of the conflict between the parties and the return of the territory or any other agreed upon arrangement. However, Israel’s presence in Judea and Samaria is fundamentally different: Its control of the territory spans decades, and no one can foresee when or if it will end”
(2)
“the territory was captured from a state (the kingdom of Jordan), whose sovereignty over the territory had never been legally and definitively affirmed, and has since renounced its claim of sovereignty; the State of Israel has a claim to sovereign right over the territory”
In our view, the Commission’s first argument is insufficiently substantiated. International law contains no definite temporal thresholds after which an occupation ceases to be an occupation, just as an occupying party’s intent to end an occupation—or lack thereof—is not a criterion for recognizing or denying the existence of occupation.
As for the second argument, it should be emphasized that:
a) It is more correct to say not that Jordan’s sovereignty “over this territory had never been legally and definitively affirmed,” but that, as of 14 May 1948, this was the territory of Israel (pursuant to the provisions of the Mandate), unlawfully occupied/annexed by Jordan.
b) At present, it no longer matters whether Jordan had any rights to these territories prior to the conclusion of the boundary treaty between Israel and Jordan; what matters is that by concluding that treaty Jordan recognized these territories as lying on the Israeli side of the state boundary.
Conclusions
(1)
As appears from the foregoing, in fact the Gaza Strip, the Judea and Samaria Area (the West Bank), and Jerusalem, under international law, are part of the territory of Israel, since they lie within its legally established borders as defined by the currently operative treaties with the neighboring states (Egypt and Jordan, respectively).
(2)
Accordingly, they cannot be regarded as “occupied.” And, legally, their annexation is impossible, since one cannot annex one’s own territory.
(3)
The legal documents defining Israel’s borders with Egypt and Jordan are its treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994). This method of establishing borders—treaties with neighboring states—is the one recognized in international law and, therefore, from an international-legal standpoint Israel requires neither the adoption of any decisions nor the signing of any other documents in order to establish its borders. And, just as for all other states in the world, the sovereign territory of Israel is the territory within its borders.
See also:
(early version) Viktor Ageyev, Where Israel’s borders run and what Israel in fact occupies // Channel 9 Israel, 2024-04-25
An even earlier version (in Russian)
See also posts on our blog:
“From the Nile to the Euphrates”: on the biblical borders of Israel